Recently, the Continuous After-the-Fact Leakage (CAFL) security model has been introduced for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. In the CAFL model, an adversary can adaptively request arbitrary leakage of long-term secrets even after the test session is activated. It supports continuous leakage even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. The amount of leakage is limited per query, but there is no bound on the total leakage. A generic leakage-resilient key exchange protocol π has also been introduced that is formally proved to be secure in the CAFL model. In this paper, we comment on the CAFL model, and show that it does not capture its claimed security. We also present an attack and counterproofs for the security of protocol π which invalidates the formal security proofs of protocol π in the CAFL model.
INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attacks are severe type of attack against implementation of cryptographic primitives. Leakage-resilient cryptography is a new theoretical approach to formally address the problem of side-channel attacks. Existing security models for two-party AKE protocols such as the CK [3] and the eCK [7] have considered an adversary that can fully compromise some, but not all secret keys. However, they do not capture the security with leakage of partial secret information. This motivates development of leakage-resilient key exchange security models and protocols.
In an attempt to construct two-pass leakage-resilient AKE protocols based on the eCK model, three models and protocols have been proposed: The first formalization was the Moriyama-Okamoto (MO) model [8] which allows bounded amount of leakage. It does not consider the continuous leakage, and the adversary cannot obtain leakage information after activation of a test session. Alawatugoda et al. [2] proposed the ASB model which considers both continuous and bounded leakage, and allows leakage after the test session is activated. However, they did not propose any protocol for the ASB continuous leakage model, and left it as an open problem. In an attempt to solve the mentioned problem, they Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. introduced the CAFL model [1] which is a weaker variant of the ASB continuous leakage model in terms of the freshness condition, and aims to capture the continuous leakage, even after the test session is activated. They proposed a generic protocol π which was formally proved to be secure in the CAFL model. In this paper, we comment on the CAFL model, and present an attack and counterproof which invalidates the security proofs in [1] . We show that the protocol π is insecure in the CAFL, ABS, MO and eCK security models.
LEAKAGE-RESILIENT STORAGE
A leakage-resilient storage (LRS) Φ = (Encode, Decode) allows to store a secret S in an encoded form such that even given leakage from the encoding, no adversary learns information about the encoded values. Protocol π [1] is instantiated using Dziembowski et al.'s public-key encryption scheme [5] which uses the following LRS model: The memory of the device is split into three parts L,R and C, where initially C is empty. L and R are chosen uniformly so that L, R = S in which . denotes inner product of the vectors. The leakage is modeled as a two-party protocol Π = (PL, PR), executed between PL and PR: PL is controlling L, and PR holds R. C is only used to communicate information between L and R, and to store messages exchanged between them.
Let λ ∈ N denotes total number of bits that an adversary can learn from each L, R ∈ {0, 1} s . A λ-leakage game is played between an adaptive λ-limited adversary M and a leakage oracle Ω(L, R) as follows: For some t ∈ N, the adversary M can adaptively issue a sequence {(fi, xi)} t i=1
of requests to the oracle Ω(L, R), where xi ∈ {L, R}, and fi : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} λ i . For the i th query, the oracle Ω replies with fi(xi). Let Out(M, Ω(L, R)) = (f1(x1), ..., ft(xt)) denotes the output of M at the end of this game.
Let ∆(X0; X1) = 1 2 x∈X | Pr(X0 = x) − Pr(X1 = x)| denotes the statistical distance between random variables X0 and X1. An LRS Φ is said to be (λ, )-secure, if for any S, S ∈ M and any λ-limited adversary M, we have
) is (λ, )-secure, and allows to efficiently store elements S ∈ F m [5] : [5] that securely refreshes (L, R) ← Encode(S), even when the adversary can continuously observe the computation from the refreshing process. Refresh takes as input (L, R), and outputs a fresh encoding (L , R ) of S such that L, R = L , R = S. For correctness, we require that Decode(L, R) = Decode(L , R ). Definition 1. A ( , λ, )-refreshing protocol: For a LRS Φ = (Encode, Decode) with message space M , a refreshing protocol (Refresh, Φ) is ( , λ, )-secure, if for every λ-limited adversary M and any two secrets S, S ∈ M , we have ∆(Exp (Refresh,Φ) (M, S, ); Exp (Refresh,Φ) (M, S , )) ≤ where Exp (Refresh,Φ) (M, S, ) denotes an experiment which runs the refreshing protocol for rounds, and lets the adversary play a leakage game in each round. The experiment is defined as follows: 1. For a secret S, we generate the initial encoding as (L 0 , R 0 ) ← Encode(S). 2. For i = 1 to , run M against the i th round of the refresh-
, and the next state of PL and PR will be (
is a polynomial in n, and negl(n) is a negligible function.
CCLA2-SECURITY
Definition 2. Security Against Adaptively Chosen Ciphertext After-the-fact Leakage Attacks (CCLA2-secure): Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. A public-key cryptosystem PKE = (KG, Enc, Dec) is λ(k)-IND-CCLA2 secure if for any PPT λ(k)-limited adversary M, the probability of winning distinguishing Game 1 is at most 1/2 + negl(k) [5] . KG(1 k ) denotes the key generation algorithm which outputs a secret key sk, and a public key pk. Enc(.) is the encryption algorithm which encrypts message m using pk, and outputs ciphertext c. Dec(.) is the decryption algorithm which uses the secret key for decryption.
, where for each decryption query c, the adversary additionally retrieves up to λ(k) bits about the current secret state sk. For the next round, update the secret state sk to sk (sk ← sk ). 3. The challenger computes c * ← Enc(pk, m b ), and gives it to M.
, where for each decryption query c = c * , the adversary additionally retrieves up to λ(k) bits about the current secret state sk. For the next round, update the secret state sk to sk .
Dziembowski et al. [5] constructed a λ-IND-CCLA2-secure public-key cryptosystem in the random oracle model in which λ = 0.15 · n · log p − 1, if the DDH assumption holds. Their scheme is based on the refreshing protocol presented in Section 2, and uses a simulation sound non-interactive zero knowledge (SS-NIZK) system, (P rov, V er), for proving the equivalence of discrete logarithms. A NIZK proof system is said to be simulation sound if any adversary has negligible advantage in breaking soundness (i.e., forging an accepting proof for an invalid statement), even after seeing a bounded number of proofs for (in)valid statements [9] . Dziembowski et al.'s CCLA2-secure PKE [5] is as follows:
Zp . Let sk = (L, R) and pk = (p, g1, g2, h = g
).
• Enc(pk, m): Sample r ← Zp uniformly at random, and compute c = (u = g r 1 , v = g r 2 , w = h r m). Run the NIZK prover P rov(u, v, r) to obtain a proof π for log g 1 (u) = log g 2 (v). Return (c, π).
• Dec(sk, c): Input for decryption is sk = (L, R) where L is given to PL, and R is given to PR . PL and PR obtain c, and parse it as (u, v, w, π). If V er(u, v, π) = reject then abort. Otherwise, proceed as follows:
−L , and outputs w i Vi. Leakage from the verification of the NIZK can be omitted as it only includes publicly known values. At any time, the adversary can play a λ-leakage game against Ω((L, U ); R) as mentioned in Section 2.
CAFL MODEL
In the CAFL model [1], each party Ui where i ∈ [1, NP ], has a pair of long-term public and secret keys, (pkU i , skU i ). Each party may run multiple instances of the protocol concurrently or sequentially. The term principal refers to a party involved in a protocol instance. The term session is used for identifying a protocol instance at a principal. The notation s U,V represents the s th session at the owner principal U , with intended partner principal V . The principal which sends the first protocol message of a session is the initiator of the session. The principal which responds to the first protocol message is the responder of the session. A session s U,V enters an accepted state when it computes a session key. A session may terminate without ever entering into the accepted state. The information of whether a session has terminated with or without acceptance is public. Adversary: The adversary M is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm which controls all interaction and communication between parties. M initiates sessions at parties, and delivers protocol messages. M can create, change, delete, or reorder messages. M can compromise certain short-term and long-term secrets. Specially for modeling leakage, whenever a party performs an operation using its long-term key, M obtains some leakage information about the long-term key.
Queries: Five queries are defined in the CAFL model: Send, SessionKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal, Corrupt, and Test. Send allows M to run the protocol. SessionKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal, and Corrupt queries allow M to compromise certain session specific information from the protocol principals. The Test query is used to formalize the notion of semantic security of a key exchange protocol. Once the oracle s U,V has accepted a session key, M attempts to distinguish it from a random session key by asking the Test query. Definitions of queries are as follows [1]:
• Send(U, V, s, m, f) query: The oracle s U,V computes the next protocol message according to the protocol specification on receipt of m, and sends it to the adversary M, along with the leakage f(skU ). M can also use this query to activate a new protocol instance as an initiator with blank m and f.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: M is given the session key of the oracle s U,V , if the oracle s U,V is in the accepted state.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: M is given the ephemeral keys of the oracle s U,V .
• Corrupt(U ) query: M is given the long-term secrets of the principal U . This query does not reveal any session keys or ephemeral keys to M.
• Test(U, V, s) query: When M asks the Test query, the oracle s U,V first chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1}. If b = 1, then the actual session key is returned to M. Otherwise, a random string chosen from the same session key space is returned to M. This query is only allowed to be asked once across all sessions. • Corrupt(U ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
• Corrupt(V ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s ).
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s ). 3. If the partner s V,U does not exist, none of the following combinations have been asked:
• Corrupt(U ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s). 4. For each Send(., U, ., ., f) query, the output of f is at most λ bits. 5. For each Send(., V, ., ., f) query, the output of f is at most λ bits. The Security of a key exchange protocol in the CAFL model is defined using the following security game, which is played by a PPT adversary M against the protocol challenger. 
Comments on the CAFL Model
Although the ASB and CAFL models are based on the eCK model, they use different names and orders for queries than those of the eCK model. Instead of the Reveal query in the eCK model, they have the SessionKeyReveal query. Instead of the Long-Term Key Reveal query in the eCK model, they have the Corrupt query. The Corrupt query was defined in the CK model but it has been removed from the eCK model as the adversary can reveal all the secret information of the party using Long-Term Key Reveal, Ephemeral Key Reveal, and Reveal queries. The CAFL model is a weaker variant of the ASB continuous model in terms of two aspects:
• The combination "Corrupt(U ) and Corrupt(V )" has been excluded from the freshness condition for passive attacks (condition 2 of Definition 4). It means that M cannot (A, B, rA, rB) KAB is the session key . Underline denotes operations to which leakage functions apply. have static long-term secret keys of both U and V , but just one of them. The CAFL model does not provide even the weak-Perfect Forward Secrecy (weak-PFS) that is an essential requirement for AKE protocols [6] . Then, it only allows partial weak forward secrecy upon compromising the long-term secret key of only one participant.
• The combination "EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s )" has been excluded from freshness condition for passive attacks. Those two combinations that are excluded from the CAFL model, are allowed in the eCK, ASB and MO models. The eCK model considers weak-PFS instead of PFS due to a belief in the security community that no two-pass AKE protocol can achieve PFS, and the best they can achieve is the weak-PFS. The belief stems from an attack presented in [6] , but is disputed and considered as an incorrect belief in [4] where the eCK-PFS model is introduced.
In the CAFL model, the adversary is allowed to obtain leakage from the uncorrupted principal, in addition to allowing the adversary to corrupt one of the protocol principals. The side channel attacks and continuous leakage of long-term secrets are modeled through the leakage function f in the Send query, assuming that the leakage happens when computations take place in principals. If the Send query is used without f, we will have the non-leakage version of the CAFL model which must address KCI attacks and partial weak forward secrecy.
It is claimed in [1] that the CAFL model addresses "most real world attack scenarios" including active adversarial capabilities (via the Send query), cold-boot attacks (via the Corrupt query), weak random number generators (through the EphemeralKeyReveal query), known key attacks (via the SessionKeyReveal query), and malware attacks (via the EphemeralKeyReveal or the Corrupt queries). It is also claimed that the CAFL model addresses all the attack scenarios which are addressed by the ASB model, except weak forward secrecy. A counterproof to two latest claims, i.e covering most real world attack scenarios, and covering all attacks scenarios covered by the ASB model, is the following practical attack scenario that is allowed in the eCK, ASB and MO models but not addressed by the CAFL model because of excluding the combination of "EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s )" from the freshness condition in Definition 4: "Two honest parties execute matching sessions. Adversary reveals the ephemeral secret keys of both parties, and tries to learn the session key" [7] . Figure 1 depicts the generic protocol π [1]. The protocol must be instantiated using a CCLA2-secure public-key encryption scheme, e.g. the scheme presented in Section 3. In Figure 1 , A denotes Alice, B denotes Bob, and KDF is a secure key derivation function which generates the session key. KG, Enc, and Dec are defined in Section 3.
REVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

COUNTERPROOF FOR SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL
Using the game hopping technique [10] , it is proved in [1] that the protocol π is λ-CAFL-secure, but we show that it is not. First, we prove that an ephemeral-KCI attack is allowed in the CAFL model, and it does not violate the λ-CAFLfreshness of the test session. Then, we show that protocol π is vulnerable to the ephemeral-KCI attack. Finally, we prove that protocol π is not λ-CAFL-secure. This invalidates the security claims and proofs in [1] .
The ephemeral-KCI attack is a variant of the KCI attack in public key-based key exchange protocols. This attack has been considered in the eCK model, and is of practical importance. It considers consequences of weak random number selections or when the attacker can affect the random number generation at the user end, for example by some security holes in web browsers. Resilience to the ephemeral-KCI attack means that M that knows ephemeral secret key of A but does not know her long-term secret key, should not be able to impersonate B, and share a session key with A.
Proposition 1. The ephemeral-KCI attack does not violate the λ-CAFL-freshness of the test session.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that all conditions for the λ-CAFL-freshness are satisfied by an ephemeral-KCI attack. The ephemeral-KCI attack is an active attack in which an adversary reveals the ephemeral secret key of a party, and impersonates other parties to this party. It can be accomplished using Send (without f) and EphemeralKeyReveal queries. As it does not use SessionKeyReveal query, the first condition of the λ-CAFL-freshness is satisfied. As it is an active attack, for an oracle s U,V , the corresponding partner s V,U does not exist, and the second condition of the λ-CAFL-freshness is not the case. As M does not ask Corrupt queries, the third condition of the λ-CAFL-freshness is satisfied. Fourth and fifth conditions of the λ-CAFL-freshness are not the case because the ephemeral-KCI attack deals with the non-leakage variant of the CAFL model (Send query without f).
Proposition 2. The ephemeral-KCI attack is allowed in the CAFL model.
Proof: M performs a simplified variant of Game 2. Among allowed queries in Game 2, M just uses the Test, Send (without f) and EphemeralKeyReveal queries. From Proposition 1, the attack does not violate the λ-CAFL-freshness of the test session. If an ephemeral-KCI attack is applicable to a protocol π, M can reach to a key agreement with the owner of the EphemeralKeyReveal query with Pr(SuccM) = 1. According to Definition 5, we have Adv CAF L π (M) = 1. Here is how M can win Game 2 with probability 1: By a successful ephemeral-KCI attack which is a deterministic algorithm, M reaches to a key agreement with owner of the EphemeralKeyReveal query. For stage 4 of Game 2, M looks to output of the Test query. If the output of the Test query is equal to the computed session key which means b = 1, M outputs the bit b = 1. Otherwise, M outputs the bit b = 0. Then, we have b = b with Pr(SuccM) = 1.
Proposition 3. The protocol π is vulnerable to the ephemeral-KCI attack.
Proof: The proof is by presenting an attack scenario in which M that has learned the ephemeral secret key rA, impersonates B and shares a session key with A.
-A selects random number rA, computes CA ← Enc(pkB, rA), and sends {A, CA} to M. -M selects random number rM, computes CM ← Enc (pkA, rM) and KAM ← KDF (A, B, rA, rM), and sends
The protocol π does not provide weak-PFS. It is not secure in the CAFL, ASB, MO, and eCK security models because of its vulnerability to the ephemeral-KCI attack.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that the CAFL security model [1] does not capture its claimed security. Furthermore, we provided counterproofs for the security of protocol π that was formally proved to be secure in the CAFL model [1] . We showed that the ephemeral-KCI attack is allowed in the CAFL model, and any protocol that is vulnerable to such an attack cannot be secure in the CAFL model. We showed that protocol π is vulnerable to the ephemeral-KCI attack which invalidates the security proofs in [1] . Protocol π is also insecure in the ASB, MO, and eCK security models.
